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Cognition, movement and morality
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds
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Abstract: Each of the criteria for determining which should be given moral standing has its
shortcomings. The criterion of cognitive is especially weak. That research on comparative cognition
may default to the simplest account is not grounds for abandoning this scientific practice. Instead,
we should dissociate scientific evidence of cognitive ability from moral obligation. In addition to
the criteria suggested by Mikhalevich & Powell for including species in welfare protections, I would
suggest a very old one — the ability to physically move.

Thomas R. Zentall, University of
Kentucky Research Professor, is a
comparative cognitive psychologist
who studies the relation between the
behavior of humans and other animals
in gambling, imitation, concept
learning, transitive inference, and
object permanence. Website

We use several measures to make distinctions among species and to decide which ones we should
care about and even protect. The cognitive ability of many vertebrates has often been
emphasized, but there is also growing evidence of remarkable intelligence in bees (Chittka &
Thomson 2001; von Frisch 1967). Macphail (1987) suggested that (although many comparative
cognitive psychologists such as Shettleworth, 1998, might disagree) most species differences in
cognitive abilities can be explained by contextual differences — differences in sensory ability,
response means, naturally occurring behavior, and motivation.
The default criterion for comparative cognition. Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) suggest
that in evaluating behavioral evidence for cognitive behavior, we should not use the criterion used
by many comparative cognitive researchers — the simplest, least cognitively sophisticated
explanation (otherwise known as Morgan’s Canon 1894) — because it will tend to result in false
negative biases.
As a comparative cognition researcher, I feel that it is important to distinguish between
the demonstrated cognitive abilities of a species and the degree that we should be interested in
its welfare. After all, we keep and often dote on animal pets, whether they are intelligent or not.
To judge cognition in terms of the simplest underlying mechanism is not only good science; it also
forces researchers to design experiments that challenge these simpler accounts. For example,
pigeons learning to match-to-sample (if a sample stimulus is red, choose the red comparison
stimulus; if a sample stimulus is green, choose the green comparison stimulus) may be taken as
evidence that pigeons have the concept of sameness. But before coming to such a conclusion,
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one must rule out a simpler account — that the pigeon has learned two stimulus response chains
(Skinner, 1950). By carefully designing experiments that control for such simpler learning, one can
provide more convincing evidence for having the concept of sameness after all (e.g., Zentall &
Hogan, 1976; Zentall, Andrews, & Case, 2018). The alternative to this more challenging route is to
interpret the behavior of other animals uncritically in terms of our own behavior and often the
emotions that are presumed to underlie our behavior, such as guilt, jealousy, or empathy (cf. Cook
et al., 2018). For example, dogs that have “misbehaved” are said to look guilty when the behavior
is discovered by their owner. But critically designed experiments suggest that the expectation of
punishment based on their owner’s demeanor, independent of their own previous behavior, is a
more likely cause (e.g., Horowitz, 2009).
The mistake is to conflate research on cognitive performance (a scientific pursuit) with
whether other species are worthy of our concern. We can conduct rigorous research on the
cognitive performance of a species while controlling for alternative accounts. Regardless of our
conclusions — e.g., that the animal being studied has a particular ability or that we are still
uncertain — we can still believe the animal is worthy of our caring.
Other factors. M&P note that the ability to feel pain might be a useful way to determine which
animals we should care about. But we really do not have a good way to measure the feeling of
pain in animals. Even in humans we generally rely on what they tell us about their pain: doctors
ask us to indicate on a 10-point scale how much pain we feel.
As it turns out, making a cognitive distinction between vertebrates and invertebrates is a
convenience of categorization. The fact that cephalopod mollusks are sometimes given the status
of ‘honorary vertebrates’ allows the distinction to be maintained despite the obvious exceptions.
Because the distinction very roughly correlates with differences in measures of intelligence, it has
been taken as evidence that invertebrates occupy a lower rung in the scala naturae. However,
any criterion we use to distinguish the animals that we should and should not care for will have
its flaws.
The fact that some arthropods carry disease and others cause us pain may have caused us
to evolve a tendency to feel disgust or fear toward them, and that makes it easy for us to separate
them from vertebrates. We should be smart enough to recognize, however, not only that many
of those species serve us very well, but that even those that do not serve us directly, often provide
food for species that we do value (such as insect-eating birds).
We can make conjectures about whether an animal feels pain by identifying brain systems
similar to our own, but that assumes that similar systems have similar functions. Although bird
brains are quite different from mammalian brains, they manage to demonstrate remarkable
cognitive skills with virtually no cortex (e.g., Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002; Pepperberg, 1999).
It apparently does not take a large brain to generate the remarkable navigational skills of dessert
ants (Collett, Collett, & Wehner, 1999), or the communication skills of bees (von Frisch, 1967).
M&P’s excellent analysis of the various measures that might be used to identify
characteristics of species warranting our moral concern leaves us with the conclusion that no
single measure can help us draw a sharp distinction. I appreciate M&P’s suggestion that as we
show that some invertebrates demonstrate the cognition and sentience of many vertebrates,
ethicists and policy makers should consider extending protections to invertebrates as well.
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An old criterion to warrant welfare consideration. I would add one more distinction to those
that M&P discuss. If sentience is important and the ability to feel pain should influence how we
treat other species (as suggested by Ibn Sēnā, an 11th century Persian philosopher) then an
indirect measure of the ability to feel pain may be an animal’s ability to physically remove itself
from the source of the pain (Janssens, 1991). Although it is not obvious that an animal able to
move must feel pain, and mobility may not be the only way for an animal to alleviate pain, it
would certainly place most arthropods and other invertebrates in the same category as
vertebrates, worthy of our moral consideration.
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